BOCHEŃSKI, Józef Franciszek Emanuel Innocenty Maria—philosopher, b. August 30, 1902 in Czuszów in the Miechowski region, d. February 8, 1995 in Freiburg, Switzerland.

In 1920 after passing the maturation examination in a gymnasium in Lwów he took part in the Polish-Bolshevik war. In the same year he began legal studies in Lwów. In 1922 he moved to Poznań where he studied economy. He did not complete these studies but in 1926 entered the Archbishop’s Spiritual Seminary in Poznań, and in 1927 entered the Dominicans. From 1928 to 1931 he studied philosophy at the University of Freiburg, Switzerland, obtaining a doctorate with his dissertation Die Lehre vom Ding an sich bei Moritz Straszewski. From 1931 to 1934 he studied theology at the Angelicum in Rome, obtaining a doctorate with his dissertation De cognitione existentiae Dei per viam causalitatis relate ad fidem catholicam. In 1934 he began to lecture logic at the Angelicum. In 1936 with J. F. Drewnoski, J. Salamucha, and B. Sobociński he founded the so-called Kraków Circle the aim of which was to restore Thomism by applying tools of mathematical logic. In 1938 he completed his habilitation degree in the theology department of Jagiellonian University with his treatise Z historii logiki zdani modalnych [On the history of modal propositions]. He took part as a chaplain and an intelligence officer in the September campaign in an armed action of the Polish Army in the West. From 1945 to 1972 he was a professor at the University of Freiburg, Switzerland, where in 1948 he received the Chair of the History of Modern and Contemporary Philosophy. He was a guest lecturer in several universities in Europe, North and South America, and Africa. In 1958 he established the Institute of Eastern Europe of Freiburg University and directed its work until 1972. He was the initiator, director (1961/1962) and government lecturer at Ost-Kolleg in Köln. He founded and edited the quarterly “Studies in Soviet Thought” and the publisher’s series “Sovietica”.

Bocheński underwent an extensive evolution in his philosophical views. He was first a Kantian, then “converted” to neo-Thomism (traditional and essentialist). In turn he tried to modernize Thomism with the tools of mathematical logic. Gradually he left behind the problematic of the philosophy of being for an analytic style of doing philosophy. In his work Bocheński distinguished four period in which different interests were partially predominant: neo-Thomistic (1934–1940), historical-logical (1945–1955), sovietological (1955–1970), and systematic-analytic (1970–1995).

He published around 60 books and several hundred articles on philosophy and the history of philosophy, especially logic and the history of logic. We may recognize the following as Bocheński’s most important works: Europäische Philosophie der Gegenwart (Bn 1947, 1951² (revised); Formale Logik (Fr 1956, Fr-Mn 1958²), as co-editor with G. Niemeyer and co-author Handbuch des Weltkommunismus (Fr-Mn 1958); Die zeitgenössischen Denkmethoden (Bn 1954, 1986⁹; Współczesne metody myślenia [Contemporary methods of thought], Pz 1992); The Logic of Religion (NY 1965; Logika religii, Wwa 1990, following edition in: J. M. B. Logika i filozofia. Wybór pism [Logic and philosophy. Selection of writings], Wwa 1993, 325–468; Logika religii, author’s translation, in: Józef Bocheński, Dzieła zebrane [Selected works], Kr 1995, VI 32–122); Was ist Autorität? Einführung in die Logik der Autorität, Freiheit, Glaube, Sozialphilosophische Studien, Mn-W 1988, 9–106; Co to jest autorytet? [What is authority?], in: J. M. B., Logika i filozofia [Logic and philosophy], 187–324).

According to Bocheński, the only true philosophy, the only philosopher deserving of the name of science, is analytic philosophy. According to Bocheński, analytic philosophy is not a school but a methodological direction that can be characterized by four mottos:

Analysis. In view of the world’s great complexity, it abandons the quest for all-embracing syntheses and is led to small works and local syntheses. It does not deny thereby the possibility of metaphysics understood as “the study of the soul, the world, and God”, although it regards metaphysics as a very difficult science and calls into question the possibility of a theory of being. At the same time the author is opposed to so-called therapeutic Wittgensteinianism.
Language. Concepts are treated as the meanings of words. Linguistic analyses are necessary to arrive at concepts. The author does not agree, however, with the approach that would reduce philosophy to linguistic analyses.

Logic. He rejects the possibility of applying irrational methods. The limits of logic are the limits of our world (outside of logic there is only nonsense). Bocheński, however, does not agree with the radicalization of this motto, which consists in the identification of philosophy and logic.

Objectivism. He rejects subjectivism. Language communicates certain contents. Bocheński dissociates himself, however, from the neopositivistic radicalization of objection that holds that only empirically verifiable impressions are meaningful and he reduces philosophy to an analysis of the language of the natural sciences.

According to certain statements of the author, the object of analytic philosophy is language, while according to other statements the object is concepts. Still other statements of the author indicate the most abstract aspects of things and processes as the object of analytic philosophy.

The object of analysis in Bocheński’s philosophy includes the view called humanism, the concept of philosophy, enterprise, system, Polish identity, world-view, authority, the autonomy of the university, a free society, questions of logic, universals, the analogical character of language, metaphysical discourse—e.g., he formulated Thomas Aquinas’s proofs for the existence of God (the so-called five ways)—religious discourse, and finally a method for scientific procedure.

Although Bocheński does not expound upon the question of the objective end of analytic philosophy, the author considers the character of philosophical thinking and can state that the end of his analyses is to show the meaning of names and propositions, to verify the soundness of certain propositions (their justification), and of methods of scientific investigations, and finally to investigate the structure of various languages (e.g., the language of religion).

According to Bocheński, when analytic philosophy considers concepts it performs three functions: it becomes an ancillary science for other sciences, it prepares new scientific disciplines (e.g., the logic of religion is an introduction to a future philosophy of religion), and it builds local interdisciplinary syntheses.

Bocheński’s method is the logical analysis of language. He is described as a “hard” analytic philosopher, that is, an analytic philosopher who uses logic in a broad sense. Logic in a broad sense as including formal logical the semiotics and general methodology of the sciences based on formal logic, plays a threefold role in relation to analytic philosophy: as the ideal model of rationality it is its “women tutor”, in providing the conceptual tools for the analysis of complex ratiocinations and for the analysis of concepts it constitutes the “organon” of philosophy, and being a certain kind of ontology, that is, the most general theory of objects (this applies chiefly to formal logic), it constitutes a section of philosophy.

According to Bocheński, analytic philosophy has social significance. This does not consist in resolving existential issues, but in contributing to the preservation and nurturing of the human reason.


Piotr Moskal